European integration is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It not only implies member states advancing together in different policy areas at the same speed. Often, it also includes certain member states - voluntarily or in a forced manner - lagging behind or preferring to disintegrate. However, differentiated integration can also be a means for willing and capable member states to advance European integration, despite the opposition from reluctant member states.
"Using go-it-alone power to overcome intergovernmental deadlock" (Acta Politica, 2023) documents how Franco-German threats to put European integration on a new basis contributed to resolving the British budgetary rebate crisis in 1984. Concerns about a multi-speed Europe and fears of being left behind led the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to make important concessions, despite her veto power on the European budget. The theoretical arguments and empirical findings from that case could have further implications for instances of intergovernmental deadlock in the present-day EU.
Here is the causal mechanism that I theorize and trace, taken from the article:
"The following sections suggest a theoretical model, consisting of four parts, on how intergovernmental deadlock comes about, how and why it deepens, and how it can eventually be overcome. The decisive factors and mechanisms include
(1) the informal or formal possibility for a national government to oppose European-level measures; (2) the agreement within a powerful group of member states that the status quo has become intolerable and must be overcome; (3) credible threats to initiate a multi-speed Europe; and (4) the fear of falling behind prompting the recalcitrant government(s) to make concessions."
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